미중정책연구소

China’s Military Reform and U.S.-China Crisis Management after the Military Display for the end of the War

Dr. Ming-shih Shen   October 20, 2015

After a massive show of force during the 70th anniversary military parade commemorating the end of the Sino-Japanese war, it might be expected that the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, would encourage his troops for their fruitful military build-up. But unexpectedly Xi promised to axe 300,000 troops from the PLA and said China was committed to peaceful development. And he pledged China would “never seek hegemony or expansion. It will never inflict its past suffering on any other nation.” It seems that Xi’s speech was not prepared for the military exercises, but for his later visit to the USA and to meet the concerns of neighboring countries.

China’s intentions

China spent a huge amount of money and resources to show off its military muscle. There must be a reason for this. First, Xi wants to win support from the PLA. The decision to cut 300,000 military personnel was aimed at advancing modernization and restructuring the defense organization. The lay-offs should be completed by 2017. We can see that all units of the PLA support Xi’s plans to downsize, with the military publishing a commentary in its own journal saying that the plan had the backing of all major military units. Second, China tried to latch onto the discourse of the Sino-Japanese War and present the PRC, rather than the ROC, as the authority responsible for victory. As a sign of confidence in her national strength and of her sincerity in seeking to safeguard world peace and stability, China showcased its sophisticated military equipment by rolling out 27 armament formations. Most of the weaponry and equipment had never been shown to the public before.

According to media reports the victory of the Chinese people in their resistance against Japanese aggression is the glory of the Chinese people, and the PRC is the sole representative authority of the Chinese people. When China announced its plan to hold a military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of its victory in World War II, wild speculation emerged suggesting that China’s primary purpose was to flex its muscles at a time of heightened tension with neighboring Japan.

Of course, the move to downsize might trigger strong resistance from the military, not only among the conservatives, but also among senior military officials who have real power. The interests of many would be affected not only because departments and units would be merged or dissolved, but also because some officials would lose their jobs and return to local government posts. Strong resistance from vested interests put the plan on hold. Moreover, it is not the only reform plan under discussion. However, Xi’s authority will receive enough of a boost from parade to enable him to make the radical move.

China-U.S. crisis management development and impact

Xi says that the military parade is intended to “remember history and uphold peace”, but the display of advanced weapons systems has already led to grave concerns about China’s military might and intentions. The rise of geopolitical friction between the United States and China in recent years has increased the possibility of a military and security crisis between the two countries. The U.S.-China relationship is becoming increasingly more complex and interdependent in areas such as cyberspace, maritime jurisdiction, nuclear weapons and space. China has disputes with many other countries over the South China Sea and the East China Sea, and with the U.S. over cyberspace. China is reminding the United States and Japan of the potential risk and cost of pursuing antagonistic policies.

In the case of the Taiwan Straits, there have been several crises in recent history, causing serious impediments to U.S.-China relations. Since the KMT returned to power in Taiwan in 2008, the situation across the Strait has obviously changed. However, some variables still exist in the political arena and neither the U.S. nor China has ceased preparations for possible military encounters. The tactics of the U.S. navy and air force in the region are designed to counter China’s growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. If the Democratic Progressive Party takes power again in 2016, U.S. - China relations may once again face a serious challenge over cross-Strait issues.

In recent years, U.S. military surveillance of China has been a major source of friction between the two countries. A collision in mid-air over the South China Sea in 2001 provoked a serious crisis. Recent years have also seen a number of dangerous maritime encounters between the two countries. Usually, crises borne of maritime emergencies are categorized as near-crises and do not cause military conflict. When there is serious misjudgment or miscalculation, however, military conflict is possible. Moreover, there is a growing tendency for the U.S. to meddle in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and the U.S. military intervention in the region is a certain way to trigger a China-U.S. crisis.

In order to strengthen crisis management, the U.S. and China must nurture their sensitivity for joint crisis management and take this issue as a strategic measure bolstering the overall interests of bilateral relations. Second, crisis-management dialogue between the two countries should become an integral part of diplomatic and defense dialogue. If dialogue on strategic stability is started between the two countries, crisis management should be part of the agenda,and realistic crises, potential crises and crises that may be caused by third-party factors should all be emphasized while crisis prevention and crisis management should be given equal priority.

Finally, the U.S. and China should deliver on the MOU on Notification of Major Military Activities Confidence-building Measures Mechanism and the MOU Regarding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters that they signed at the end of 2014, and work to turn these documents into formal agreements.

The U.S. and China should also actively seek to expand cooperation. For instance, the two sides should consider establishing a periodic notification mechanism and regularly exchange information regarding space debris. The two sides should also consider promoting CBMs in the domain of space, such as reciprocal commitments not to disrupt or destroy the space assets of the other side.

In order to maintain the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States can ill afford to stumble into a new conflict, given simmering tensions elsewhere. The U.S. and other states have, on one hand, been seeking greater engagement with China’s military. The distrust and suspicion between the U.S. and China shows little sign of abating anytime soon. The U.S. is actively trying to mobilize its allies in the region and help beef up their means of countering China’s new military capabilities, but it must employ the non-war uses of its military power. Military presence and diplomacy, as well as exercises with allies and partners, are traditional strengths of the U.S. armed forces, but the reduction of the full spectrum of options for U.S. leaders requires new approaches if security objectives are to be achieved. Both improving cooperation in the area of shared goals and agreeing on mechanisms to manage tension and crisis are urgently needed to complement existing approaches to U.S.-China relations.

(Dr. Shen is Associate Professor, Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies, Executive Director of Center for Strategic Studies, War College, National Defense University)

http://www.pf.org.tw/Pages/ResearchManage/ResearchDetail.aspx?id=26317